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1Abstract
Food safety events in the recent past have generated signiﬁcant media attention and resulted in
increased concerns over the food on the plate. A recent study (Degeneﬀe et al., 2007) on consumer
perceptions of bio-terrorism and food safety risks shows increasing concern over food safety and
corresponding decreasing conﬁdence in security of the U.S. food supply. While there are some
mandated safety and security practices for the ﬁrms in the food supply chain the economic incentives
for the ﬁrms to actively address food safety throughout the supply chain are less clear. Security
practices often require signiﬁcant investments in both within the ﬁrm and across the supply chain
but do not show tangible returns. Also, higher investments in securing the ﬁrms’ processes and
products do not necessarily make the food products more safe if the supply chain partners exhibit
higher risks. However, a risk that is realized can potentially bankrupt the ﬁrm. Some high-proﬁle
cases of food safety outbreaks have had substantial economic consequences such as, lost sales, recall
and compensation costs, damaged goodwill and hence impact on future markets. Such incidents can
lead the ﬁrms out of business and the impact is not contained just at the ﬁrm level but also felt
throughout the food supply chain.
The issues of economic incentives and disincentives for risk mitigation strategies and investments,
in a highly vulnerable area such as food sector, are an emerging area of concern both in private and
public sector management as well as academic research. The research questions of interest that
this paper addresses are: How much should the ﬁrm invest to address the security and safety
risks that it faces? The optimum investment levels, among other things, are a function of the
probabilities of contamination levels exceeding the maximum acceptable standards set. We consider
a speciﬁcation for the contamination levels follow gamma distribution as it exhibits the fat tail
2property which suggests that extreme events are more likely than predicted by the normal Gaussian
form. Previous work by Mohtadi and Murshid(2007) has highlighted the fat-tail nature of extreme
events for chemical, biological and radionuclear (CBRn) attacks, which are of intentional nature.
However, for food safety risks of unintentional nature the fat-tail nature of the distribution though
suggested, is not yet established in literature. The present model leaves less scope for analytical
solutions but lends itself to numerical methods, which we employ to examine the ﬁrm strategies.
Our preliminary model and its analysis suggest that infact for very low levels of risk exposure
no investment in security is required! However, as the standards loosen and risk increases the
optimum amount of investments also increase. Though the result here are intuitively consistent,
they are largely dependent on the parametric speciﬁcation of the model and their sensitivity to the
parameter values is yet to be tested.
JEL Classiﬁcation Letter : L100, L800
31I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most important supply chain networks in the U.S. economy is the food supply chain, which
includes crops, livestock, distribution, processing, retail, transportation and storage and accounts
for about 13 percent of the U.S. GDP and around 18 percent of domestic employment (FDA report,
2003). While there are several pressing issues facing the U.S. food supply- climate change, nutrition
and obesity, genetic tinkering, carbon footprinting to name a few, the two key questions that have
garnered much attention of late are: (1) Is the food safe?; (2) Is the supply chain secure?
1.1 Unintentional risks
This highly critical U.S. "farm-to-table chain" has also been exposed to many inadvertant conta-
mination events resulting in over 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths
each year in the U.S. (FDA report, 2003). Some major food related outbreaks both within U.S.
and internationally worth reiterating are: Outbreak of Salmonella typhimurium infection that af-
fected approximately 170,000 people in 1985 and was linked to post-pasteurization contamination
of milk from a U.S. dairy plant; An outbreak of hepatitis A caused by tainted clams aﬀected nearly
300,000 people in China in 1991; Outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis infection in 1994, linked to
contaminated ice cream pre-mix sickening an estimated 224,000 people in 41 states in the U.S; E.
coli 0157:H7-tainted radish sprouts served in school lunches, in 1996, that resulted in about 8,000
children in Japan getting ill, and some dead; Foot and Mouth Disease(FMD) epidemic 2001 in UK
involving 2030 cases spread across the country, with about 6 million animals culled (4.9 million
sheep, 0.7 million cattle and 0.4 million pigs), resulting in losses of some £3.1 billion to agriculture
and the food chain (Defra report, 2004); the 2006 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak in spinach. These food
4safety risks arise not only due to microbial agents but also from signiﬁcant residuals from pesticides,
toxic chemicals and even due to mislabeling of products containing allergens. The U.S. food supply
chain has signiﬁcantly global interlinkages with the rest of the world. This has further contributed
to an increase in its own exposure to the food safety risks and vulnerabilities that its trading country
ﬁrms face. For example, in 1989, approximately 25,000 people in 30 states in the U.S. were sickened
by Salmonella chester in cantaloupes imported from Mexico. In 1996 and 1997, 2,500 people in 21
states in the U.S. and two Canadian provinces developed Cyclospora infections after eating tainted
Guatemalan raspberries. More recently, in March 2007, pet food contamination through tainted
wheat gluten imported from China, sickened and killed a large unknown number of pets, largely
cats and dogs1.
1.2 Intentional risks
Cases of intentional contamination, as opposed to unintentional contamination incidents, are not
very infrequent either. World Health Organization (WHO) (2002) report on terrorist threats to
food considers food terrorism as a real and current threat, and that deliberate food contamination
at one location could have global public health implications. There have been reported intentional
contamination incidents of salad bars with salmonella bacteria, food at a laboratory with Shigella
dysenteriae, 200 pounds of ground beef with a nicotine based pesticide within the U.S (FDA, 2003).
The most detailed chronology to date of intentional use of chemical, biological and radionuclear
(CBRn) agents worldwide that involve food events, though not limited to them, (Mohtadi and Mur-
shid, 2006), is available at the website of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense.
1There are only 14 cases reported but due to lack of database on animal sickness an exact number is unavailable.
Individual estimates range from 100 to about 3600 deaths.
5Mohtadi and Murshid (2006) analyze CBRn event data using extreme value theory that suggests
probability distributions of extreme events such as food terrorism have fatter tails than those pre-
dicted by normal distribution. This implies greater frequency of such extreme events than that
predicted by the normal distributions. Many of the contamination agents in the case of intentional
events are the same pathogens that have been linked to signiﬁcant outbreaks of foodborne illness due
to unintentional contamination. Thus, outbreaks not linked to criminal intent can actually expose
the vulnerabilities in food supply and may increase the threat of a terrorist act.
1.3 Safety and security
Food safety is a credence2 characterisitc and hence the credibility of the food product needs to be
established by some forms of food safety policies, if the market fails to provide suﬃcient information
about this attribute (Cho and Hooker, 2002). While there are some mandated safety and security
practices for the ﬁrms in the food supply chain the issue of economic incentives for the ﬁrms to
actively address food safety throughout the supply chain is unclear. These practices often require
signiﬁcant investments in capital3 and labor4 too, but do not have tangible returns. It is diﬃcult to
estimate the value of preventing a safety incident. However, a risk that is realized can potentially
bankrupt the ﬁrm5. Some high-proﬁle cases of food safety outbreaks have had substantial economic
consequences such as, lost sales, recall and compensation costs, damaged goodwill and hence impact
2Safety is a credence characteristic of a product. This implies that it is an attribute of the product that cannot be
observed or inferred by direct inspection, on consumption or even after consumption (Latvala and Kola, 2004).
3for example, pasteurizing euipment for milk
4for example, education and training in safe food handling practices
5E. coli contamination of ground meat led to bankruptcy of Topp’s Meat company, which by 2007 was one of the
country’s largest manufacturers of frozen hamburgers.
6on future business. Although such incidents can lead the ﬁrms out of business, the impact is not
contained just at the ﬁrm level but also felt throughout the food supply chain. Supply chains are
often faced with various risks of supply disruptions and uncertain demand conditions, these food
safety events and security events arising from either intentional or unintentional events pose risks
that are above and beyond the common operational and market risks, bringing the overall level of risk
to unprecedented new levels. There is a greater emphasis in highlighting the role of product safety,
especially in the food industry, given the recent spate of several high proﬁle food safety incidents
(such as recalls for ground beef, pet food, green onions and spinach scare, etc.) and decreasing
consumer conﬁdence in food supply (Degeneﬀe et al., 2007).As a result, a supply chain manager’s
"best practice" model today is to strive to achieve not only a fully integrated and eﬃcient supply
chain, capable of creating and sustaining competitive advantage (Christopher and Towill, 2002), but
also one with suﬃcient ﬂexibility and redundancy to enable the ﬁrm to respond to extreme events
(Sheﬃ 2005). Natural calamities, port lock-outs, labor disputes, terrorist events, major recalls,
outbreaks and epidemics are examples of such intentional and unintentional events that lie beyond
market uncertainties and could cripple not just ﬁrms but entire supply chains. There is a strong
argument for building robust and ﬂexible systems that eﬀectively handle contamination incidents
and increase the buoyance of the ﬁrm in the wake of an event (Sheﬃ, 2005).
1.4 Research Approach
Firms’ investments in safety and security measures can be braodly classiﬁed into two areas: ﬁrm-
centric investments that secure the ﬁrms’ own premises, such as investments in information systems,
employee training and education, Hazard and Critical Control Point(HACCP); supply chain collab-
7oration eﬀorts and investments, such as veriﬁcation of supply chain partner’s safety and security
measures, auditing partners’ procedures, colloborating on security training and education. In this
paper we attempt to model the strategies of the ﬁrms along these two broad but complementary
areas of investments. We ﬁnd a strong argument for this approach in an earlier work by Agiwal and
Mohtadi(2008). Thus, the question of interest then is: How much should the ﬁrm invest in each of
these areas given the risky nature of its operations. The model presented here is in its development
stage and hence the the results provided here are preliminary. We discuss the possible areas of
improvement and extension to the present model.
2P a s t s t u d i e s o n s e c u r i t y i n v e s t m e n t s
Most research on supply chain revolves around issues in inventory management, network planning,
coordinating demand and supply, logistics and such which have resulted in better tools and tech-
nologies for supply chain managers and improved the overall process and performance. Planning
for supply chain disruption risks is also an actively researched area (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005;
Tomlin, 2006; Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Jüttner, Christopher and Lee, 2004; Chopra et al.,
2007) although most of the focus is on managing disruption risks arising out of normal operations of
the ﬁrm. Post 9/11, however, there is increased concern on risks arising out of extreme events like
terrorism, natural calamities, port lockouts and also food safety outbreaks (given the recent surge in
such events). There is limited but growing amount of literature on justifying supply chain security
investments (Sheﬃ, 2001 and 2005, Peleg-Gillai et al. 2006) and improving security quality (Lee
and Whang, 2003). The methodological focus in these studies has been on experiential analyses.
Sheﬃ (2005) claims that there is substantial empirical evidence that superior contingency plan-
8ning can signiﬁcantly mitigate the eﬀect of a disruption: Home Depot’s policy of planning for various
types of disruptions based on geography helped it get 23 of its 33 stores within Katrina’s impact zone
open after one day and 29 after one week. Wal-Mart’s stock pre-positioning helped make it a model
for post hurricane recovery. Similarly, Nokia weathered the 8 minute ﬁre at Phillips semi-conductor
plant in 2001 through superior planning and quick response, allowing it to capture a substantial
portion of its slow-to-respond competitor Ericsson’s market share. Sheﬃ(2005) makes a case for
two types of investments — security investments encompassing security and safety concerns, and re-
silience investments that are directed towards building ﬂexibility and redundancy to protect against
disruption risks. Hendricks and Singhal (2003,2005) analyzed announced shipping delays and other
supply chain disruptions reported in the Wall Street Journal during 1990s and showed based on
matching sample comparisons, that ﬁrms experiencing disruptions under-perform their peers signif-
icantly in stock performance as well as operating performance as reﬂe c t e di nc o s t s ,s a l e s ,a n dp r o ﬁts
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). The globalization of the supply chain with suppliers, manufacturers,
retailers and consumers spread far and wide for most of the products makes the supply chain more
vulnerable. Hence when thinking about reducing ﬁrm’s vulnerability to disruptive events, Sheﬃ
and Rice (2005) advocates that managers need to look into increasing not just safety measures but
also safety awareness and a proactive safety culture thereby making ﬁrms and supply chains more
resilient.
Food safety events in the recent past have generated signiﬁcant media attention and resulted in
increased concerns over the food on the plate. A recent study (Degeneﬀe et al., 2007) conducted in
three waves (July 2005, March 2007, May 2007) on consumer perceptions of bio-terrorism and food
safety risks shows increasing concern over food safety and corresponding decreasing conﬁdence in
9safety of the food supply. The ﬁndings also suggest an increasing concern over potential terrorist
events in the food supply, although post 9/11 no such incident of national signiﬁcance has been
reported. However, there have been widely publicized food recalls and food safety incidents. All
this is suggestive of a signiﬁcant confounding between food safety and food terrorism incidents in
the U.S. consumers. Comparing this confounding between safety and security risks to the guidelines
established by the World Health Organization (WHO), which state that the outbreaks of both
unintentional and deliberate foodborne diseases can be managed by the same mechanisms (WHO,
2002), indicate the spillover eﬀects of food safety investments from increasing safety to improving
security and vice versa. There are strategic complementarities that arise from investments in safety
and security in addressing both inadvertent and delibrate risks in the food supply and in this research
we focus on such complementary nature of investments.
Mohtadi et al.(2007) investigate a question similar to the one addressed in our research, of opti-
mum investments for food safety breaches of intentional nature. This study focuses on catastrophic
risks in the food sector and they use a probability model calibrated using data from Chemical Bi-
ological and Radionuclear (CBRn) attacks from 1960 to 2005. While catastrophic risk insurance is
available for speciﬁcally such types of risks this study cites the limited availability of such forms
of insurance. Muermann and Kunreuther (2006) study on optimal investment in self-protection of
insured individuals implies that in a market equilibrium there would be underinvestment in self-
protection. The Terrorism Risk and Insurance Protection Act of 2002 was established precisely for
federal provision of insurance claims in the case of such terrorism events. However, this provision is
set to phase out by the end of this year(2007). Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan(2006) paper points
out that in the wake of 9/11 attacks, natural disasters and the signiﬁcant stock market declines,
10most reinsurers were left with a signiﬁcantly reduced capital base, which resulted in them reducing
their terrorism coverage drastically or even completely stopping from covering this risk. USDA’s
Economic Research Service (ERS) has estimated the medical costs and productivity losses that can
be expected to occur from E. coli 0157:H7 infection. The estimates range from $216 million annu-
ally for the low estimate of cases to $580 million annually for the high estimate. This places it as
the fourth most costly foodborne disease for which ERS has estimated costs, behind one parasite
(Toxoplasma gondii) and two bacteria (Salmonella and Campylobacter)(Marks, 2007).
For modeling investment strategies for ﬁrms where there are signiﬁcant interdependencies and
hence spillovers of both risks and beneﬁts, a game theoretic approach has been considered and
developed in a series of papers by Kunreuther and Heal (2004, 2005 and 2006). Their work highlights
the fact that when expectations about others’ choices inﬂuence investments in risk-management then
the outcome can be sub-optimal for everyone. They look at terrorism risks in airline industry (2005)
as well as the common features of pollution risks, computer security breaches and airline baggage risks
(2005). When accounting for the adaptive nature of such security risks Cremonini and Nitzovtsev
(2007) show that the eﬀect of a given security measure is much stronger and not calculating this in
could lead to underinvestment in security or even a misallocation in security resources. Similar to
the framework developed by the Kunreuther and Heal body of work, Zhuang et al. (2007) examine
the equilibrium strategies for multiple interdependent defenders in a model where threats occur over
time. Their study shows that existence of myopic agents can make it undesirable for non-myopic
agents to invest in security when it wold be otherwise in their interests to do so and hence they
explore subsidizing strategies for such investments. While the studies cited here use a horizontally
interdependent framework, our analysis focuses on the interdependences that arise in a vertical,
11supply chain framework.
The other stream of literature relevant to this research is in the area of computer security. To
promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber security information among ﬁrms, the U.S. federal gov-
ernment has encouraged the establishment of many industry-based Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs) (under Presidential Decision Directive(PDD) 63 in 2001) for critical infrastructure,
of which IT is one, as well as internet security reporting centers such as Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team (CERT) and InfraGard (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005). This is has spurred the debate on
economic incentives for information sharing and has led to developing a new focus area on economics
of information security. Some relevant papers that deal with security investments in this area by
Gal-Or and Ghose (2005), Gordon and Loeb (2002), Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn (2003). These
papers provide economic models for both information sharing and security investments in informa-
tion sharing technologies. Gordon and Loeb (2002) provides a general framework for determining
optimum security investments for protecting an information set with a speciﬁc vulnerability and a
given potential loss. An empirical analysis by Tanaka et al. (2005) of e-local government in Japan
supports such relation between vulnerability and investment. The model the decision problem of a
risk-neutral ﬁrm to determine the amount to invest in information security by comparing expected
beneﬁts of the investment with cost of the investment and using two diﬀerent functional speciﬁca-
tions for security breach probability. Their model predictions are that the optimal investment in
information security is always less than or equal to 36.79% (or 1/e) of the loss that would be expected
in the absence of any investment in security. However their model does not address the problem
of externalities arising from the security investments. These predictions have been under attack by
Hausken (2006) where he shows that alternate speciﬁcations of the security breach probability func-
12tions the optimum investments can no longer be capped at 36.79% of the losses. A separate study
by Willemson (2007) shows that only slightly modifying the assumptions of Gordon-Loeb (2001)
security breach probability function, the optimum investments can be upto 50% or even 100% of the
potential losses.
As opposed to the cost based approach used by Gordon-Loeb (2002) framework, Gal-Or-Ghose
(2005) starts with a demand function facing the ﬁrm with an in-built net beneﬁt function. Their
net beneﬁt function captures both, information sharing strategies and investments in information
security and also includes the spill-over eﬀects of information sharing. Their ﬁndings suggest that (1)
security technology investments and security information sharing are strategic complements, and (2)
joint associations like ISAs would result in higher sharing and investment levels than under market
conditions, but lower than socially desirable levels.
3 Theoretical Framework
For this study we deﬁne safety as the assurnace that the contamination in the product will be
contained at a maximum allowable standard. Contamination could arise due to existence of elements
that were not designed to be in the product. It could be intentional or deliberate and could cover
possibilities of impurities, pesticides, allergens, tampering or fatal mislabeling. Some degree of
contamination is present in all products, however, the safety level in a product must be reasonably
high for it to be acceptable and not lead to signiﬁcant losses. We assume here that the distribution
of the safety attribute follows a fat-tail distribution. This implies that the probabilities of the safety
being compromised are higher than those suggested by the normal symmetric distributions. This
we defend as a reasonable assumption given earlier work in the area of safety and security events
13(Mohtadi et al. 2006). Also, if the cost considerations are high the rewards for maintianing higher
than acceptable standards are low. But given that we do not involve pricing issues here we can
assume that the safety follows a gamma distribution.
We consider a one-period model of the ﬁrm’s decision to determine its optimum security in-
vestments based on risk considerations. The security investments can be in capital, equipment for
sanitizing, or for inspection, or labor, such as training and education programs for employees. We
do classify the investments in two broad areas of ﬁrm centric investments, kfand supply chain col-
laborative investments, ks. The assumption here is that these security enhancing investments help
in minimizing the potential losses that the ﬁrm faces in case of an event. These investments can pos-
sibly have spillover eﬀects on resilience of the ﬁrm and hence inﬂuence the estimates of losses faced
by the ﬁrm. However, we do not consider such eﬀects for now. Although the risks can come from
diﬀerent sources we consider safety risks that arise from ﬁrms association with its suppliers, primar-
ily through the inputs received from the suppliers’ inputs. We assume a risk neutral manufacturer
who knows the probability distribution of contamination in the inputs she receives. Alternately,
the manufacturer may infer the probability distribution of contamination, based on their historical
records.
Food safety and security risks have important economic considerations for the ﬁrm. Faced with a
large product recall can make a leading and established food manufacturer shut down its operations,
the Topps Meat Company’s closure after facing the second largest recall of ground beef in U.S.
history6 is a case in point. Thus, though ﬁrms face enormous cost considerations when deciding
6In October 2007, Topps Meat, leading manufacturer and supplier of premium branded frozen beef products for
supermarkets and mass merchandisers closed shop after 67 years in operation due to the economic impact of the
second largest ground beef recall in the history of United States. The recall was initiated due to possible E. coli
14what level of food safety to choose, these considerations are not the only constraints that enter
the decision managers’ planning. The losses arising from contaminated products are large and can
threaten the very business of the ﬁrms. Safety and security investments can then be thought in the
context of self protection against possible losses for the ﬁrms. The ﬁrms will make these investments
only upto the point where the expected loss reduction is greater than the cost of investment itself.
This optimum level of investment is now modeled as a function of the loss reduction beneﬁts provided
by it. The framework for determining optimum investment is based on earlier work by Gordon-Loeb
(2002) and Mohtadi et al.(2007). The important distinction of the Stage 1 of model presented
here with respect to Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Mohtadi et al. (2007), lies in the formulation
of the expected loss. Gordon and Loeb (2002) include the concept of ﬁrm’s vulnerability, v, and
a contingent loss L. The expected loss then is simply vL. Mohtadi et al. (2007) take a slightly
diﬀerent approach and model the ﬁrm’s loss in proﬁts as the expected loss. In this paper we invoke
the expectd net beneﬁt function as in Gordon and Loeb (2002) but include use risk exposure arising
due to the ﬁrm’s association with its supplier as well.
3.1 Model
Consider a single manufacturer, denoted by M, of a product, for which she sources inputs from
supplier, say S. The inputs sourced from this supplier have a certain safety level. Let X be amount
of contamination level tolerated in the input received from supplier S.T h e nX is a random variable
probability distribution denoted by P(X) and a cumulative distribution function denoted by F(X).
Suppose S has a contamination acceptance standard set at ¯ s, measured in terms of the amount
O157:H7 contamination.
15of contamination tolerated (say as parts per million of the input 1). Let ¯ s be tolerable amount of
contamination acceptance standard by M. We also assume here that the dispersion parameter in
the probability function for X depends on the amount of supply chain collaborative investments
undertaken ks.Thus, the total expected loss when no investments are made is given by,
E(L|kf =0 ,k s =0 )=λ0(1 − F(X =¯ s|ks)L
while, total expected loss when investments kf and ksare made is given by,
E(L|kf > 0,k s > 0) = λ(kf)(1 − F(X =¯ s|ks)L + kf + ks
where P(X>¯ s)=1 − F(X =¯ s|ks) is the probability that the contamination level in the input
exceeds the contamination standard ¯ s.
To mitigate or even reduce the risk of contamination that maybe present in the inputs received
by the manufacturer, the manufacturer undertakes two types of investments-ﬁrm centric investments
kf and supply chain collaborative investments ks. These investments can be thought of as a one
time costs that help reduce the loss faced by the manufacturer from λ0 (when the manufacturer
makes no investments, that is, kf =0 )t oλ(kf),w h e r e0 ≤ λ(kf) ≤ λ0.
The loss function λ(kf) must be such that as investments kf increase the loss levels should fall,
that is,
∂λ(kf)




λ(kf)=0 . If we assume here decreasing marginal















(1 + kf)3 > 0
Several functional speciﬁcations for such a loss function with decreasing marginal rate of return as
speciﬁed above exist in literature (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Mohtadi et al., 2007, Willeamson, 2007).
Hausken (2006) summarizes speciﬁcations that assume logistic or bounded marginal rates of return.
The notion of food safety risk is captured here by the probability distribution of contamination
level in the inputs received by the manufacturer. This probability could be informed by past inspec-
tion level data of each suppliers’ inputs or through historical observation of number of outbreaks
associated with the underlying input for each supplier. For purposes of illustration, here we consider
that the contamination levels follow gamma distribution with scale parameter θ and shape para-
meter η. If η is an integer then one can think of the distribution representing sum of η events of
contamination level exceeding the speciﬁed standard, where each such event is itself exponentially
distributed with mean θ.With this speciﬁcation the average number of such events occurring is given
by ηθ (mean of gamma(η,θ)) and the variance is given by ηθ
2(variance of gamma(η,θ)). We chose
gamma distribution as it exhibits the fat tail property which suggests that extreme events are more
likely than predicted by the normal Gaussian form. Previous work by Mohtadi and Murshid(2007)
has highlighted the fat-tail nature of extreme events for CBRn attacks, which are of intentional
nature. However, for food safety risks of unintentional nature the fat-tail nature of the distribution
is not yet established7. For now, we consider that each supplier has diﬀerent parameters for the
gamma distribution and that the contamination levels for each supplier are independent. Thus,
7The recent reporting of outbreaks and food recalls provides some support for this hypothesis, but I am still















Now θ here is the scale or dispersion parameter which accounts for the variation in the data. We





See Appendix A for the details. Thus, as dispersion in the data increases the cumulative prob-
abilities fall and the probabilities of contamination levels greater than the set standard rise. This
probability of contamination level greater than a speciﬁed level is what we label as exposure to risk.
This can be interpreted as - increase in risk arising due to the variability in the data increases the
probability that the impurity levels exceed the set standards.
Note however, that the dispersion paramter itself is assumed to eb a function of the amount of
supply chain investments made by the ﬁrms. As the ﬁrm invests more in supply chain collaborative
eﬀorts the dispersion in the the safety level of the attributes is assumed to decrease. This implies
that the ﬁrms that invest more in colloborative eﬀorts have better understanding and co-ordination
with their suppliers and hence lower risks arising from their association with them. We specify the
dispersion as a function of ks such that
∂θ(ks)
∂ks < 0 and
∂2θ(ks)
∂k2
s > 0, yeilding a function form similar
18to the loss function, that is, θ(ks)= θ0
1+ks, where θ0 is some intial value of θ not inﬂuenced by
investments ks.
The manufacturer’s problem is then to decide on the level of investments kf,k s that would
maximize her beneﬁt from investing in security. We formulate the manufacturer’s decision problem
as determining the level of security investments that she must make for given acceptance standard
and the probabilities of impurity levels exceeding the set standards.
Manufacturer’s problem of maximizing her expected net beneﬁt function (ENBF) from making





{E(L|kf =0 ,k s =0 )− E(L|kf > 0,k s > 0)}
= Max
kf,ks





(1 − F(X =¯ s|ks))L =1
⇒ kf =
p
λ0(1 − F(X =¯ s|ks)L − 1
and,
−λ(kf)









The one of the second order conditions that needs to be satisﬁed is ηθ < ¯ s. This implies that the
acceptance standard must be suﬃciently larger than the mean of the distribution. See Appendix B
for details on second order conditions.
3.2 Numerical Analysis
The given problem formulation does not provide explicit analytical solution for k∗
f,k ∗
s. Also, note
that the optimum values depend on cumulative distributions of impurity levels. From the ﬁrst order
conditions we see that for very low levels of risk exposure no ﬁrm centric investments in security
are required. In fact it may be counter productive to invest in kf for lower levels of expected losses.
The results for ks are less clear. Any further conclusions using the analytical exposition at this stage
are not clear and show great deal of dependencies on the parameters of this model. We, hence have
attempted a simple numerical solution for k∗
f,k ∗
s. Assuming the following values for the parameters
of this problem: η =5 ,θ 0 =5 ,λ 0 =0 .9. We use numerical methods to arrive at the optimizing values
of k∗
f,k ∗
s for diﬀerent values of acceptance standard ¯ s at losses L = $500,000 and at L =$ 1 million
for illustrative purposes. The eﬀect of tightened standards on the optimum investment levels k∗
f is
illustrated in the Figure 1 and that for k∗
s is illustrated in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insert Figure 2 about here
The ﬁgures illustrate that when acceptance standards are tight, that is the value of ¯ s is small the
optimum investments, both k∗
f and k∗
s are high. As the standards loosen shifting the ¯ s further to
20the right the optimum levels of investments go down. For very high levels of tolerance for risks the
optimum levels of investment are actually negative suggesting that at such high tolerance levels it is
better for the ﬁrm to not invest or even divest from security investments. This makes intutive sense,
as the ﬁrm’s appetite for risk increases, its investments in reducing the risk decreases. The impact
of ﬁrm centric investments is modeled to be greater than that of supply chain centric investments,
which is reasonable considering the ﬁrm faces larger liabilities for security compromises on its own
premises than through risks due to its supply chain partners. The numerical solutions support this.
The interesting result here is that the optimum level of ﬁrm centric investments decline much sharply
as compared to supply chain investments. Firms allocate a larger share of their security investments
in ﬁrm centric measures. As security investments decline k∗
f sees a much larger fall than the smaller
share of k∗
s. Though the results here are intuitively consistent, they are largely dependent on the
parametric speciﬁcation of the model and their sensitivity to the parameter values needs to be tested.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
With the given model formulation there are certain issues that we need to address. In the current
version of the paper we have speciﬁed gamma distribution for its fat tail nature. Given that the
results can be highly sensitive to the nature of the distribution speciﬁed we will aim to test the
robustness of the results for other fat-tailed ditributions such as Pareto distribution. The loss values
used here are ad hoc. Mohtadi and Murshid (2007) provide certain loss values based on their analysis
and ﬁtting of the CBRn data. We also attempt to explore diﬀerent studies in the risk and insurance
(Henriet et al.2006), and food safety literature for inputs in this exercise. With the present model
we have not considered the interaction between the ﬁrm and its supply chain partners that inﬂuence
21the risk proﬁle of the ﬁrm. The supply chain colloaboration investments are modeled for a ﬁrm
independently of the investments made by its supply chain partners. Often there arise externalities
from such investments and modeling them explicitly would lead to a fuller analysis. The inﬂuence
of ﬁrm size, market power and supply chain scope are found to have signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrm’s
security bhavior (Agiwal et al., 2008). Our analysis needs to be expanded to include these important
considerations in the ﬁrms optimum investment decision.
There is signiﬁcant dearth of literature in the area of food safety as well as security risks faced
by ﬁrms in the food sector. The question of economic incentives and disincentives for risk mitiga-
tion strategies and investments, in a highly vulnerable area such as food sector, is not suﬃciently
addressed. Though this is a important issue facing both, private and public sector management and
policy development there is little research done to address the economic issues involved. With this
paper we aim to bring to front these issues in food sector research.
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25Appendix A: Eﬀect of increase in dispersion (scale) parameter on the cumulative
distribution for Gamma
X ~Gamma(k, θ), where k>0 is the shape parameter8, θ>0 is the scale parameter, contami-
nation level x>0





x>0,k , θ> 0
The mean is kθ and the variance is kθ
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du u > 0; k,θ > 0































































zk−1e−zθdz]...by transformation of variables: u
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θ)].....
8Note that this k is a parameter and not identical to the investments variable used earlier.
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θ)ke−
¯ s1
θ ] − k
θγ(k, ¯ s
θ)]....










Thus, an increase in the scale parameter leads to an decrease in the cumulative distribution
function unambiguously.
⇒
∂(1 − F(¯ s;k,θ))
∂θ
≥ 0
Appendix B: Second order condition for maximization of Expected Net Beneﬁt
Function
For second order cons=ditions to be satisﬁed the Hessian matrix must be negative deﬁnite.
This implies f11 < 0 and f11f22 − f12f21 > 0









> 0, and (1 − F(X =¯ s|ks))L>0) .
Also, the cross derivatives (f12,f 21) are symmetric and such that,
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⇒ kθ < ¯ s
Now consider the second second order condition:
f11f22 − f12f21 > 0





(1 − F(X =¯ s|ks))L which is
less than or equal to zero. The condition f22 =
∂2(1−F(¯ s;k,θ(ks)))
∂ks2 < 0. Also, the cross derivatives
(f12,f 21) are symmetric and such that,







To ensure that the Hessian will be negative deﬁnite and hence the solution to the ﬁrst order
conditions are indeed maximizing the objective function we must have,
f11f22 − f12f21 > 0
⇒− λ0























































































































































kf for loss=1million usd
Figure 1:

































ks value for loss=1
million usd
Figure 2:
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